Never play the game of chicken

Reviewing the events of the past few days, I am reminded of the “game of chicken”. In game theory, the phrase “game of chicken” is used as a metaphor for a situation where two parties engage in a showdown where they have nothing to gain, and only pride stops them from backing down.

Bertrand Russell once compared the game of chicken to nuclear brinkmanship:

Since the nuclear stalemate became apparent, the Governments of East and West have adopted the policy which Mr. Dulles calls ‘brinkmanship’. This is a policy adapted from a sport which, I am told, is practised by some youthful degenerates. This sport is called ‘Chicken!’. It is played by choosing a long straight road with a white line down the middle and starting two very fast cars towards each other from opposite ends. Each car is expected to keep the wheels of one side on the white line. As they approach each other, mutual destruction becomes more and more imminent. If one of them swerves from the white line before the other, the other, as he passes, shouts ‘Chicken!’, and the one who has swerved becomes an object of contempt. As played by irresponsible boys, this game is considered decadent and immoral, though only the lives of the players are risked. But when the game is played by eminent statesmen, who risk not only their own lives but those of many hundreds of millions of human beings, it is thought on both sides that the statesmen on one side are displaying a high degree of wisdom and courage, and only the statesmen on the other side are reprehensible. This, of course, is absurd. Both are to blame for playing such an incredibly dangerous game. The game may be played without misfortune a few times, but sooner or later it will come to be felt that loss of face is more dreadful than nuclear annihilation. The moment will come when neither side can face the derisive cry of ‘Chicken!’ from the other side. When that moment is come, the statesmen of both sides will plunge the world into destruction.

Sounds familiar? The events in Mindanao, if not handled properly, might turn into a “game of chicken”.

Solve the problem!

This may sound simplistic but if there is one thing I would like to say to our national leaders, it is this: SOLVE THE PROBLEM!

We are trying to solve a real problem and it requires real solutions. Not legal ones.

There is war in Mindanao. There exists (irrespective of whether we like it or not, irrespective whether we believe their cause is just or not) an armed group of about 12,500 armed regulars who are calling for an independent Bangsamoro homeland. They demand independence and are willing to use force to attain their end. They do not recognize our Constitution. They do not recognize our government’s jurisdiction over them. They will not lay down their arms (even if we say “please”). What is our response? Please do not tell me that our response is a petition to the Supreme Court.

Well, there are 2 possible responses. First, we can go to war. Declare all-out war like what Estrada did and try to eliminate all the members of the MILF and its symphatizers until there is no one left to carry the aspiration for a separate Bangsamoro homeland or until they are so weakened by the war that they will be willing to surrender their aspirations and live under our command.

If we do not have the appetite for war, then peaceful political settlement is the way. But the solution will be clearly political, not legal. It will require new power-sharing arrangements. It will require “new” rules. It will require re-imagining age-old concepts of “sovereignty”, “territorial integrity”, and “democracy”.

The challenge then to our leaders who are serious about the peace process is propose new political arrangements, new rules. Once that solution is found, to call on their lawyers, their constitutionalists and find ways to implement the solution. It cannot be the other way around.

To our leaders: do not focus on the challenge in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may come out with a sound and well-researched decision. It may even be hailed as a legal “opus” but if the problem of conflict and war is not solved, if it does not bring an end to the war and violence in Mindanao, what good is that? What is the value of a legal victory if war persists?

The people are asking their leaders: how do we end the war in Mindanao? They are waiting for real answers, not press releases, not Supreme Court petitions. They have been waiting for over 30 years now. Will it all be in vain?

First principle and foundation: The Bangsamoro as a First Nation

That the TROed Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Agreement of Peace of 2001 raised a hornet’s nest of raw emotions is an understatement (MOA on AD). Almost everyone wants to get into the fray to express their opinion and positions. In fact, the MOA on AD has opened a Pandora’s box that exposed the deep divide between peoples and sectors in the Philippines, especially in Mindanao. What has been lurking in the hearts of men and women has now come out.

In times of trouble and confusion, I find consolation in my favorite saint’s advice to always remember what he called the “first principle and foundation”. It is an invitation to go back to the core principle, to the underlying logic, to the first passion that led to the enterprise for in so doing so “clarity of vision” is attained.

Let us then go back to the “original” spirit, to the raison d’etre of the whole process that triggered the drafting of the MOA on AD, let me begin by saying that the “first principle and foundation” of the peace process between the Government and the MILF is the acknowledgment (long denied) that the Bangsamoro people is a “people distinct from the rest of the national communities” and that they are the “First Nation”. This is highlighted in the MOA on AD:

“Both Parties acknowledge that the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people is rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The Moro sultanates were states or karajaan/kadatuan resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of nation-state in the modern sense. As a domestic community distinct from the rest of the national communities, they have a definite historic homeland. They are the “First Nation” with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations. The Parties concede that the ultimate objective of entrenching the Bangsamoro homeland as a territorial space is to secure their identity and posterity, to protect their property rights and resources as well as to establish a system of governance suitable and acceptable to them as a distinct dominant people”

This is the first principle and foundation: that the Bangsamoro people is a distinct people and a First Nation. This principle provides the impetus and foundation for the application of the provisions of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which states:

“1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development;

2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.”

If the Bangsamoro people is indeed a First Nation, a people unto themselves who are distinct from the rest of the national communities, then it is logical that the Bangsamoro people possess inherent and unequivocal rights which are demandable from the Philippine State, irrespective of whether these rights are found in the Philippine Constitution or not. In fact, it is imperative that if these rights are not found or protected in the Philippine Constitution that the Philippine State should initiate a process to entrench these rights. If the “rules” of the game do not, at present, allow these rights, then “new rules” must be put in place. This, as I have already stated, is the essence of peace talks - negotiating for “new rules”, to change the present “rules”.

If one accepts the statement that the Bangsamoro people is a “distinct people” and a “First Nation” then it follows that they have the following basic rights:

1. The right to self-determination.
2. The right to freely determine their political status.
3. The right to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
4. The right to freely dispose their natural wealth and resources.
5. The right not to be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

The MOA is nothing but the explicitation, the articulation, and the enfleshing of the basic rights mentioned above. The MOA is the operationalization of the
inherent right to self-determination.

Of course, if one does not agree with this first principle and foundation, then we will have divergent opinion on the MOA on AD and more. We should always respect our differences but we must try to understand where we differ and I think most of our disagreements stem from our disagreement with this first principle and foundation. ###

Yes, Virginia, peace talks will always be unconstitutional (actually “extra-constitutional”)!!!

“Social conflicts” arise from a dissatisfaction on how a particular “game” is played. It is the assertion of a disadvantage region or group of people (the “losers”) that the “rules” of the game are heavily stacked in favor of another party or parties (the “gainers”). To resolve “social conflicts”, the rules must be changed. Peace talks then is always “beyond the law”. To insist that peace talks should be in “accordance to the Constitution”, i.e. subject to the very “rules” that it seeks to change, is to completely misunderstand the essence of talking peace. Again, peace talks is about “rule-change”. It will always be “extra-constitutional”!

It is the assertion of the MILF that the “rules” of the game has led to the political and social marginalization and the economic disadvantage of the Bangsamoro people as a whole. They assert that the present “game” is defective because, whatever the configuration, whatever the arrangement, in the end, the “Bangsamoro people” will always be the “losers”. For the MILF, the present “rules” has led to grinding poverty and powerlessness of the Bangsamoro people vis-a-vis Philippine mainstream society. It is for this reason that they are asking for a change in the “rules” — greater political autonomy, greater control of resources, a defined territory, etc.

The Philippine Government has basically 2 ways to respond to this demand. First, they can dismiss the demand outright, insist that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with “rules” and require absolute compliance to it and if the MILF remains recalcitrant, to compel obedience to the “rules” by the use of force.

On the other hand, Government can go into peaceful political negotiations with the MILF by admitting that there is something fundamentally wrong with the “rules” of game, negotiate new “rules” to respond to the Bangsamoro problem and then, change the old “rules” accordingly.

Government has clearly chosen the second track and has put forward the MOA on Ancestral Domain as part of the package of “new rules” that are offered to end the long-standing conflict in Mindanao. To demand that the Government’s talks with the MILF be within the ambit of the Philippine Constitution and prohibit it from discussing matters which are prohibited or not allowed by the present Constitution is to call for a reconsideration of Government’s chosen track. It calls for a re-evaluation of the policy of the “primacy of the peace process”. It is to say that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the “rules” of the game, that they do not need any changing at all.

Will this track of insisting that there be no discussion of “rule change” lead to durable peace in Mindanao? Will it solve the basic social conflict? ###

The Supreme Court is now in control of the Mindanao peace process

Whether by deliberate design or not, the Supreme Court has now total control of the Mindanao peace process. Its decision, whether to permanently enjoin the Government from signing the MOA or to lift the temporary restraining order, will have serious political, economic, social, security and diplomatic implications. The challenge now in the Supreme Court is not merely a legal challenge. It is a challenge to review Government’s policy directions vis-a-vis peace in Mindanao. It behooves the Court to now demand that Government provide it with all state information - economic, political, security, intelligence, the disposition of forces, government arsenal, etc. so that it can formulate the necessary guidelines on how to move forward in Mindanao. Thousands of lives and property depend on the Supreme Court’s judgment. ###

If the Supreme Court rules as “unconstitutional” the MOA, can it order the parties to renegotiate?

ABS CBN On Line in its banner story Rebel warns fighting in Mindanao could spread stated:

“Legal experts say the court will likely rule that the agreement is unconstitutional and order both sides back to the negotiating table.

But Iqbal said that was not an option.

“We will not agree to any re-negotiation. We don’t know how the government would re-start the talks if the deal is declared unconstitutional,” he said.

Are these “legal experts” kidding?

1. The suit in the Supreme Court has only the Government as a party. The MILF is not. For obvious reasons, the MILF is a revolutionary organization. It does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Philippine State and its organs over them. This is its very raison d’ etre: the non-recognition of the Philippine State as having jurisdiction over them. This is something that the Government already knew when it started the talks. Government could have chosen to tread the path of all-out war and not peace talks. But Government did not. Government asked the MILF if it would be possible that instead of fighting, they sit and negotiate. The MILF agreed so long as Government does not mention the Philippine Constitution as the “parameter” and to this request, the Government also agreed so long as the MILF will not mention “independence”. Done. it was this gave and take and opened the peace talks - a peace process that has brought down the number of armed hostilities from as high as 670 incidents in one year to almost zero the next year, a peace process that has brought moderate development in the conflict-affected areas.

2. Because the MILF is not a party, the Supreme Court then can theoretically “control” only Government’s actions, e.g. enjoin permanently the Executive from signing the MOA on Ancestral Domain. But it cannot order the parties to go back to the negotiation table and re-negotiate. To re-negotiate what? To renegotiate something that the Supreme Court can potentially rule again as “unconstitutional”. Such absurdity will make the Supreme Court the chief negotiator for the peace talks. If such is the case then it might be better for the Chief Justice or one of the justices to head the negotiating panel so as to save time and effort.

3. Assuming that the Supreme Court orders the parties to go back to the negotiating table and the MILF refuses, what will the Supreme Court do? Have the MILF cited for contempt? who will enforce that contempt order? if the MILF still refuses to go back to the negotiating table and breaks the talks? What will Supreme Court do? Issue another order for the parties to negotiate?

4. We are dealing here with a social problem and our toolkit must be beyond what the present Constitution provides. This is about policy. Let us propose a policy and then work out the needed changes in law and the constitution to make such policy a reality. It cannot be the other way around. We cannot say that all solutions must follow the present Constitution for that limits our capacity to solve the Bangsamoro problem.

I was listening to Cong. Ruffy Biazon over UNTV this morning and one of his arguments against the MOA on AD is that the President has a sworn obligation to “defend and protect the Constitution” ergo any intent to change or amend the Constitution is a violation of that sworn oath. That seems to be stretching the limits of constitutionality too much. The President has sworn to “protect and defend the Constitution”, a constitution which includes provisions of its very amendment. Changing the Constitution is part of the Constitution that the President is sworn to protect and defend.

5. It is clear then that the Supreme Court must wait for the opportunity to rule when the issue is ripe for adjudication. Government and the MILF are just about to agree on a roadmap, a set of principles that will govern the concrete solutions which will be proposed and ratified by the people themselves in the future. Until then, the Supreme Court must be true to its mandate of being an arbiter of justiciable issues. ###

2 types of oppositors

The discussion and the debate over the MOA on Ancestral domain has become a circus. People are opposing, supporting or even just fence-sitting for various, sometimes contradictory, reasons. There is a need for clarity of thought. If I have my way, I think we should focus on the basic policy directions as contained in the unsigned MOA.

But let us first plot those who are opposed to the MOA. There are basically 2 types of oppositors (of course, there are those who belong to both types) and their arguments can be summed up as follows:

1. Type 1 OPPOSITOR: “I disapprove of the MOA because PGMA will use that opportunity to perpetuate herself beyond 2010 (Cha-cha).”

Former Presidential Adviser on Peace Process Ging Deles would be a prime example of this type.

No Arroyo term extension motive behind Moro homeland accord

“In an interview with abs-cbnNEWS.com/Newsbreak, Teresita ‘Ging’ Deles, former presidential adviser on the peace process, said the planned shift to a federal system would allow the Arroyo government to include other agenda items on charter change, including a shift to a parliamentary system.

“When you open charter change, can you say it’s only up to this point?” she asked.

Deles said that since the Hello Garci scandal in 2005, Arroyo’s overriding concern has been how to survive politically. She claimed that Arroyo will continue to use whatever loophole there is to allow her to stay in power beyond 2010.

She urged the people to again be vigilant in opposing these moves.

Deles said the government negotiating panel could have instead given wide and deep powers to an expanded Moro homeland instead of pushing for a shift to a parliamentary system of government.

“You can try a law establishing greater powers in the BJE. After all, the concept of an autonomous government is in the Constitution. In fact, the complaint is that the law that was passed is not real autonomy,” she said.

Deles assailed the Arroyo government for not making clear its intentions, which is why many sectors are suspicious with the MOA-AD.

“That’s why I’m saying, when people should be happy with this breakthrough, it becomes so suspect because the actions of the leadership raise so many questions on her real agenda,” she said. “Is this peace making by improvisation or is it cha-cha not for peace but for political survival?”

2. TYPE 2 OPPOSITOR: “I oppose the MOA because it is unconstitutional, i.e. it offends sovereignty and territorial integrity. i.e. will led to the dismemberment (chop-chop) of our country.” Prime examples here would be Former Senate President Frank Drilon and Adel Tamano of UNO.

In an interview, Former Senate President Frank Drilon :

“The GRP-MILF MoA on Ancestral Domain will give rise to a ‘chop-chop republic’ as the creation of the Bangsamoro homeland, with its own people, territory and form of government, will dismember the Philippines,” Drilon on a television talk show this morning. “This is a gross violation of the 1987 Constitution.”

Senatoriable Adel Tamano has this to say:

“Under the MOA, the President had ‘effectively ceded part of the territory of the Philippines to the MILF.’

Tamano cited Section 3 on concepts and principles of the MOA, which states that “ancestral domain does not form part of the Philippines’ public domain.”

“Obviously, GMA (Ms Arroyo) is not empowered to give up any part of our country to any group, only the Filipino people can do that in their sovereign capacity and only via amending the Constitution,” he said.

Tamano warned that the signing of the MOA would grant the MILF the “status of belligerency” and could open the door for a declaration of independence.”

I think we need to focus more our discussion on the substantial elements of the MOA and to respond to the issues raise by Type 2 Oppositors. We must not let national political dynamics (pro-GMA vs. anti-GMA) determine the outcome of the peace process in Mindanao. The question of whether the President will use the opportunity to be presented by the peace process to perpetuate herself beyond 2010 is an issue separate and distinct from the substance of the MOA on AD. The MOA is the fruit of years of negotiations. It did not come out of the blue. We are trying to solve a 450 year conflict here. To subordinate the conversations on the MOA to present political dynamics alone is a great disservice and insult to the Bangsamoro people. ###

What is the Philippine Daily Inquirer’s Agenda?

Last bulwark

….When the Supreme Court stepped in and prevented the signing of the agreement, the Philippine, Malaysian, American, Japanese and Australian governments ended up red-faced in the company of the MILF (which neither recognizes nor has any loyalty to the Philippine Constitution). Opposite them are those against the deal because they believe it fundamentally subverts the existing provisions of the Philippine Constitution. Their voices reflect majority opinion in our country. They are waiting to see if the Supreme Court ends up deciding the case with dispatch merely to beat Malaysia’s announced Aug. 21 resumption of talks. The country is watching whether the Court will decide based on the real merits of the case, or on what the President wants. In a word: since no one, including the nations of the world, cares for our Constitution, then it remains for our Supreme Court to decide the matter with true integrity and the utmost fidelity to constitutional precepts. As Jose P. Laurel famously declared, “No one can love the Filipinos better than the Filipinos themselves.”

First, the Philippine Constitution is not a fixed, immovable object. It can be amended to suit the will of the people.

Second, the MOA on Ancestral Domain is really a set of agreed principles, a roadmap to govern a process of introducing changes in the Philippine legal infrastructure, including amendments to the present Philippine Constitution, to attain the public policy contained in the Memorandum of Agreement.

Lastly, no provision of the MOA will ever be in force and in effect without the consent of the Filipino people. The enforcement of the MOA and the subsequent Comprehensive Compact will follow the processes laid down in the Philippine Constitution, i.e. there will be national referendum to approve or not the changes in the Constitution.

So what does the Inquirer mean when it says: “then it remains for our Supreme Court to decide the matter with true integrity and the utmost fidelity to constitutional precepts?” What fidelity to the Constitution are they talking about? To be faithful to the Constitution means to rule against the MOA?

I expect the Inquirer to be more balanced in treating the problem of the Bangsamoro.

That obsolete concept of belligerency

One of those “phantoms” that parties opposed to the MOA, e.g. Vice Gov. Pinol in his petition with the Supreme Court, use is the concept of “belligerency”. According to them, if Government signs the MOA on AD such act will accord the MILF “belligerency” status.

Atty. Soliman Santos, international law expert, explains why such argument is obsolete (this piece can very well also be a clarion call for the overhaul of the curriculum and concepts of teaching International Law in Philippine law schools).

“Belligerency status” concept is obsolete - Atty. Soliman M. Santos, Jr.

A specter is haunting the unsigned Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)-Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) – the specter of “status of belligerency.”  It is about time, even long overdue, to lay this obsolete concept to rest in the Philippines, as it is already “resting in peace” in the rest of the civilized world of modern international law.   

It is best, for the sanity of the emerging national debate (now necessary) on the MOA-AD, that a non-issue like “belligerency status” be cleared from the muddle of the discussion, where more light rather than heat is needed.  In this way, the way will be clearer in dealing with the real and valid issues (and worst fears) like whether the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is an independent sovereign nation-state separate from the Philippine state, whether the MOA-AD can be sufficient basis for a subsequent unilateral declaration of independence by the Bangsamoro (Moro nation) people led by the MILF, and so on.

Offhand, from the term “belligerency” itself which connotes hostility (and its plural, hostilities), the concept deals with a situation of armed conflict, particularly internal armed conflict, within the territory of a State.  The recognized belligerent force acquires international personality, directly possessed of rights and obligations in international law.  But this is only for the purposes of the hostilities.  Its recognition is provisional in nature and limited to the duration of the hostilities from which it results.  It does not apply to a post-conflict situation as would arise from a peace settlement which the MOA-AD is working towards.  On this score alone, the MOA-AD cannot be the basis for any “belligerency status” – even if this concept is not obsolete (but it is).

“Belligerency status” is an old concept in traditional international law that has basically been superceded by a more recent international legal regime and gone out of use in terms of state practice as well as legal opinion in the modern era of the 20th century (that’s last century yet!).  It is “only in the Philippines” where there is a time-warped adherence to this concept, largely due to the influence of traditionally-oriented textbooks on public international law (PIL) on many generations of Filipino lawyers and to its repeated invocation by the rebel National Democratic Front (NDF) esp. since 1996 (and which has become one of the many banes in the GRP-NDF peace negotiations).  It should be reassuring to note that the MILF, to its credit, has not similarly invoked or spoken of “belligerency status.”

The standard textbooks on PIL in the Philippines, like Salonga & Yap, Paras, Cruz, Coquia, and Defensor-Santiago, reflect the traditional concept of “belligerency status,” along with other classical categories of civil conflict like “insurgency” and “rebellion.”   These represent three different levels of the armed conflict, from highest to lowest in terms of intensity and politico-military capability of the belligerent/insurgent/ rebel force, whichever status must be recognized expressly or impliedly by the State concerned or third states before certain rules and rights apply.   These rules and rights mainly have to do with the application of appropriate rules of war towards the armed opposition force. 

According to Eibe H. Riedel in his article on “Recognition of Belligerency” in the Encyclopedia of Public International Law, it is granted primarily for the purpose of bringing the laws of war and in particular the rules of humanitarian law in armed conflict into operation.  For example, captured belligerents (as distinguished from insurgents or rebels) should be treated as enemy combatants with the rights of prisoners of war.  The recognition is also intended to settle relations with third states to the extent necessary for the protection of their own nationals and other vested interests.  Thus, it would be no longer the legitimate government but the belligerent force that is to be held responsible for its own acts affecting foreign nationals and their properties.

The practice of recognizing insurgents as regular belligerents was developed during the 19th Century (two centuries ago!) when an increasing number of civil wars broke out.  After World War I (1914-18), this practice declined to the point of virtual obsolescence, as it became cumbersome under drastically changed (from classical to guerrilla) forms of armed conflict.  After World War II (1941-45), a new approach relying on objective criteria, rather than subjective recognition, had virtually replaced it.  This was the regime of international humanitarian law (IHL) consolidated in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and, after the Vietnam War ended in 1975, was supplemented with the two 1977 Additional Protocols, including Protocol II for non-international armed conflict.  This regime expressly provides that its application “shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict,” and thus certainly does not imply recognition of “belligerency status,” the very concept it replaced.     
        
When I was still based in Naga City in 1991, Olivier Durr, Head of Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the Philippines, wrote me:  “You will see that the recognition of belligerency is an obsolete legal institution which was not even a generalized and accepted practice, but rather an instrument of the policy of the USA in the Southern American affairs at the turn of the [20th] century…. I have always been amazed at the importance given to this subject by both parties [referring to the GRP and NDF] in the Philippines.  Sad enough, the application and respect of IHL, even in its fundamental principles, have been made more difficult because of this unnecessary political requisite.”  His sense of “belligerency status” as obsolete has been reaffirmed by modern authorities in international law.

Heather A. Wilson, in International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford University Press, 1988 ) says:  “In practice, the traditional international law on recognition of insurgency and belligerency is more theoretical than real.  Since World War I, the recognition of belligerency has scarcely ever occurred and not at all since World War II.  Even in the Spanish Civil War [1936-39] the insurgents were never recognized as belligerents…”  

Long-time International Review of the Red Cross editor Hans-Peter Gasser, in International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction (Paul Haupt Publishers, 1993) says:  “Of mere historical interest is the notion that the government of a State engaged in a conflict may recognize the insurgents as a belligerent party… Such a declaration was last made during the Boer War (1902); recognition of the South as a belligerent in the American War of Secession was only tacit.”  

Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, in International Organizations and Civil Wars (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), say:  “Much of the case law [on belligerency] derives from wars of independence in South America [in the 19th Century]… In a post-1945 context this model is no longer wholly adequate. “  

Ingrid Detter, in The Law of War (Cambridge University Press, 2000), says that the idea that the application of the rules of armed conflict are related to the recognition of belligerency has been “abandoned.” 

And most recently, Andrew Clapham, in Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press, 2006), says:  “Today, these recognition regimes have been replaced by compulsory rules of international humanitarian law which apply when the fighting reaches certain thresholds.”

It is about time that the phantom menace of  “belligerency status” be laid to rest in Philippine discourse.  It should also be reassuring to note that the MILF (and for that matter, the NDF), in several prior agreements it has signed with the GRP before the MOA-AD which reiterates their “non-derogation,” has committed itself to IHL, thus conceptually superceding any notion of “belligerency status,” if any there was at its end.- August 7, 2008

Blessed are the peacemakers

 

Blessed are the peacemakers

“Blessed are the peacemakers for they will be called children of God” (Matthew 5:9)

The challenge of the Beautitudes is to “peacemaking”. It is a call to action and not passivity. It is a call to challenge institutions, mindsets and frames that sow discord, that impedes the flowering of full human development, especially of those who do not share our religious beliefs.

To be a christian is to be an active builder of peace and to engage in the great debates of our times for there are many who say they love “peace” but only a few who work for it. 

This the reason why Archbishop Tony Ledesma’s voice (and that of Archbishop Quevedo) is very important for the peace process in Mindanao. They have seen the ravages of war and conflict and see the need to push the peace process. Of course, it goes without saying that the peace process as currently handled (or mishandled) leaves a lot to be desired. The lack of effective transparency, of bringing the peoples of Mindanao into an authentic dialogue has not happened. Maraming mga pagkukulang ng gobyerno, ng MILF, ng mga national and political leaders and this has created a lot of problems and fears that now threaten the Mindanao peace process.

It is imperative that the Church and civil society must now take active participation in the peace process. They must not leave the peace process in the hands of Government and the MILF alone. Without the people’s support, no peace process will succeed. When everybody is being dragged to take positions (either pro or con) the Church and civil society must provide the space for dialogue.

 

2 bishops back gov’t-MILF MOA

Both Ledesma and Quevedo said the MOA-AD was not the end of the peace talks and discussions on the proposed Bangsamoro homeland. Both of them said the government and the MILF still had to discuss and explain the contents of the document to the public.

“But the MOA-AD need not be the document that should contain all the details that would resolve all questions and doubts,” Quevedo said. “The peace process will continue even after it is signed. With good will, patience and wisdom—and consultation—such further steps will surely resolve substantive questions.”

Ledesma said, “I think it’s a step-by-step process. There’s still a plebiscite and a consultation.

“The basic principle of the plebiscite is to make sure that the inhabitants are of one mind.”